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ABSTRACT
Publishers have spent the last decade and a half struggling
against falling prices for digital goods. The recent antitrust case
against Apple and the major publishers highlights collusive price
fixing as a potential method for resisting depreciation.
This Article examines the myriad ways in which digital
distribution puts downward pressure on prices, and seeks to
determine whether or not collusive price fixing would serve as an
appropriate response to such pressure given the goals of the
copyright grant. Considering retailer bargaining power, increased
access to substitutes, the loss of traditional price discrimination
methods, the effects of vertical integration in digital publishing,
and the increasing competitiveness of the public domain, I
conclude that the resultant downward price pressure might in fact
significantly hamper the commodity distribution of digital goods.
I remain unconvinced, however, that price fixing is an
appropriate solution. The copyright grant affords rights holders
commercial opportunities beyond simple commodity distribution.
These other methods for commercializing e-goods suggest to me
that current pricing trends are not indicative of market failure, but
rather of a changing marketplace.

INTRODUCTION
The future of distribution in the entertainment industry is decidedly,
if not entirely, digital. The MP3 has vanquished the CD;2 Netflix has killed
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Blockbuster;3 nobody reads magazines in any form;4 and the e-book in all
its myriad incarnations seems poised to displace increasingly large volumes
of printed text.5 The significance of this shift for the content and
entertainment industries is difficult to overstate. In the digital world,
downward pressure on prices is everywhere. For producers of content, the
reason is easily distilled: Digital availability has made “piracy”6 a
household activity.7
The reality is unsurprisingly more complex, although “pirates” play
a role. Let us assume, on grounds to be expounded later, that there is a
source beyond piracy responsible for the downward price pressure
threatening the digital content industry. Let us assume that this cause is
simply the competitive economy for digital content, where producers are
free from the shackles of marginal cost and where consumers can easily
locate providers of substitute goods. That is, access to free or nearly free
entertainment is not merely the result of free-culture activists and Cory
Doctorow giving away valuable things without charge. In this view, rapid
depreciation of cultural commodities is not simply a side effect of the
activities of idealists and scofflaws, but rather a competitive reality.
If such depreciation is indeed reality, what can the content industry
do to preserve itself? Answers to this question take many forms: new
business models, new remedies for copyright infringement,8 and digital
rights management are all common attempts at solutions. For publishers, the
answer may have been to collude on prices, using Apple, Inc. as a facilitator
3

See Dawn McCarty, Blockbuster Files for Bankruptcy After Online Rivals Gain,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-23/block
buster-video-rental-chain-files-for-bankruptcy-protection.html.
4
Plainly an overstatement. Regardless, the future is not bright for magazines. See
Katerina-Eva Matsa, Magazines: By the Numbers, STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA
2012, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/magazines-are-hopes-for-tablets-overdone/
magazines-by-the-numbers/ (last visited Mar. 2013).
5
See Dana Wollman, E-book sales triple year-over-year, paper books decline in
every category, ENGADGET, (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.engadget.com/2011/04/15
/e-book-sales-triple-year-over-year-paper-books-decline-in-every/.
6
I use the word reluctantly, as it is emotionally charged, overwrought, and without
legal significance. It does, however, capture the mood of industries that must deal
with copyright infringement as a quotidian consumer activity rather than as a blackmarket business activity.
7
See Joe Karaganis, Copyright Infringement and Enforcement in the U.S., THE AM.
ASSEMBLY (Nov. 15, 2011), http://piracy.ssrc.org/the-copy-culture-surveyinfringement-and-enforcement-in-the-us/.
8
In particular, graduated response (or “three strikes”) laws have been in vogue
internationally, coming into effect most notably in France and New Zealand. The
United States has a private-ordering equivalent in the “six strikes” program recently
implemented by the country’s largest internet service providers.
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for their decision to collectively and simultaneously switch pricing methods
and tiers. Consolidation and collusive changes to pricing strategy would
indeed be straightforward remedies for an industry in crisis, though these
come at the risk of drawing antitrust scrutiny.
It is my intention to examine whether the cause of saving a
languishing industry is dire enough to merit some loosening of our antitrust
rules to permit these alternative, facially anticompetitive solutions to pricing
trends for digital goods. The lens through which I address my inquiry is the
case the Justice Department recently brought against Apple, Inc. and several
global publishers, alleging horizontal price fixing in the e-book market. The
Apple suit makes for an attractive target for such an examination because it
has engendered significant and, in my view, somewhat unexpected popular
pushback to the government’s claims. As I detail more thoroughly below,
Apple conspired to fix prices with what were then five of the six largest
publishers in the world, successfully discontinuing Amazon.com, Inc.’s
practice of selling bestsellers at $9.99 and raising the effective price floor
for such books to $12.99. I find it odd that there appears to be little popular
umbrage at a successful attempt to raise book prices, and wish to tease apart
whether there is substance to this sentiment.
My exploration begins in Part I by relating the story of the lawsuit
and the popular backlash it has engendered. In Part II, I outline the relevant
laws, both in antitrust and in copyright. As antitrust jurisprudence leans
heavily on economics, I take care to outline the pertinent economic
attributes and goals of copyright law and how they might change in a digital
environment. I apply these legal and economic principles to the current ebooks market, examining whether the copyright grant is reasonably
effectuated despite current downward price trends. Having examined the
theoretical merits of the position that we should treat markets for digital
goods differently, I ultimately conclude in Part III that, while competitive
markets for digital goods may well be an existential threat to ailing
incumbents in the content industry, any collusive remedy is even worse.

I. THE APPLE SUIT
On January 27, 2010, Apple made a pair of groundbreaking
announcements: First, they introduced their new tablet computer, the iPad.
Second, they unveiled the newest component of their media sales empire,
the iBookstore, a digital bookstore tailor-made to launch with the new
device.9 Despite the hype, the iBookstore as a product was conspicuously
unremarkable, promising digital downloads of e-books to Apple’s newly

9

Steve Jobs, Apple iPad Launch Keynote (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.
youtube.com/watch?NR=1&v=ia42hMuFz_g at 03:00.
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expanded iOS-based product line in much the same way that third-party
software already allowed.10
However, before launching, Apple made arrangements with a
number of publishers to provide content for the iBookstore. “We’ve got five
of the largest publishers in the world that are supporting us in this and are
going to have all their books on the store,” was the framing the late Steve
Jobs announced at the unveiling. While Apple product launches tend toward
hyperbolic language, this was no exaggeration. Apple’s launch partners
were Penguin, Hachette, HarperCollins, Simon & Schuster, and
Macmillan—that is, every major publisher except Random House.11
The arrangement was startling not because Apple had agreed with
publishers to sell their books—that much would be commonplace. Instead,
the Apple deal changed the entire market for e-books in one fell swoop.
Previously, e-book retailing functioned in much the same way as retailing of
physical books, where publishers charged wholesale rates to retailers, who
in turn were free to set retail prices as they saw fit.12 Amazon, by far the
country’s largest e-book retailer, had been using its freedom as a retailer to
price books aggressively, usually at $9.99—an amount that for some
bestsellers was below cost.13
Apple’s store functioned very differently. Publishers sold books
through Apple under an agency model,14 whereby Apple would sell e-books
10

Barnes and Noble’s “Nook,” Amazon’s “Kindle,” and a number of other lesserknown apps provided this functionality on Apple’s iPhone and continued to provide
it on the iPad.
11
It is worth noting that the publishing market is considerably more concentrated
today than it was in 2010, with significant merger activity taking place between the
above-listed firms. Bracket whether or not such mergers might be in pursuit of the
same objective as the Apple agreement. Regardless, such merger activity is subject
to DOJ scrutiny in a way that backroom agreements plainly are not.
12
Complaint at 9, United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 12 CV 2826).
13
Id.
14
Interestingly, the agency model itself has its roots in antitrust law. For a very
long period of time, antitrust’s per se rule applied to the practice of resale price
maintenance whereby a manufacturer would require a retailer not to sell their
product below a certain price. Compare Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (holding resale price maintenance per se illegal)
with Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling
Dr. Miles). While vertical price restrictions remain subject to some antitrust
scrutiny, agency relationships had been earlier proven as a workaround to the per se
rule. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) (“[T]here is
nothing as a matter of principle, or in the authorities, which requires us to hold that
genuine contracts of agency like those before us, however comprehensive as a mass
or whole in their effect, are violations of the Anti-Trust Act.”).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

133

on behalf of the publishers who were free to set their own prices subject to
some constraints. Under Apple’s plan, these prices hewed to certain tiers;
for hardcover books, this would mean prices of $12.99, $14.99, or $16.99,
depending on the physical copy’s cover price.15 At the hands-on event
following the announcement, Walt Mossberg of the Wall Street Journal
asked the question on everyone’s mind: How would Apple compete? Why
would consumers pay $14.99 at the iBookstore for the same book that
Amazon would sell for $9.99? Jobs’s confident reply: “That won’t be the
case. The price will be the same.”16
Jobs was not wrong. Apple’s contracts with the publishers included
a most-favored-nation clause, requiring the publishers to allow Apple to
provide the lowest price.17 In fact, Jobs framed these contractual
arrangements as assisting the publishers in providing pushback against
Amazon’s aggressive e-book pricing. As he told his biographer the day after
the announcement:
Amazon screwed it up. It paid the wholesale price for some books, but
started selling them below cost at $9.99. The publishers hated that —
they thought it would trash their ability to sell hardcover books at $28.
So before Apple even got on the scene, some booksellers were starting
to withhold books from Amazon. So we told the publishers, “We'll go
to the agency model, where you set the price, and we get our 30%, and
yes, the customer pays a little more, but that's what you want anyway.” .
. . So they went to Amazon and said, “You're going to sign an agency
contract or we're not going to give you the books.”18

Ultimately, Jobs’ description mirrors almost exactly the actual
course of events. The deal with Apple facilitated an industry-wide switch
from the wholesale model to the agency model, and to a new effective price
floor of $12.99.
From the perspective of the publishers, the deal was an opportunity
to strike back at the market dominance of the leading e-book retailer,
Note that resale price maintenance is likely to be at its most
anticompetitive where it is done by colluding firms in a concentrated industry,
effectively as a tool in a horizontal price fixing agreement, as is alleged in the
Apple case. See Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the
Absence of Free Riding, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 431, 474 (2009).
15
Complaint at 4, United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 12 CV 2826).
16
Ken Auletta, Publish or Perish, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 26, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/04/26/100426fa_fact_auletta.
17
Complaint at 20–21, United States. v. Apple Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 623 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12 CV 2826).
18
WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 503–504 (2011). The quote was given to
Isaacson, Jobs’ biographer, the day after the iPad launch. Id.
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Amazon.19 The publishers were furious with its $9.99 price point, and
allegedly needed to act collectively to force the retailer into accepting a
higher price.
Two years later, on April 11, 2012, the Department of Justice filed
a complaint charging the publishers and Apple with illegal price fixing
under § 1 of the Sherman Act.20 The Justice Department’s allegations, if
true, are damning: The complaint recounts stories of regular clandestine
meetings between the publishing executives, without attorneys, to discuss
their problems with Amazon’s pricing. Furthermore, emails between
members of the alleged cartel reveal attempts to remain surreptitious, with
recipients instructed to “double delete” the messages.21
All of the publisher defendants have since settled with varying
amounts of protestation.22 Apple, however, with its considerably deeper
pockets, appears committed to seeing the case through to the end. But my
project is concerned less with the outcome of the case than with the issue it
frames.23 The reaction amongst the commentariat has been overwhelmingly
sympathetic to the publishers,24 who were admittedly in a bind. Amazon
was devaluing books by pricing them so aggressively and Amazon was
keeping its competitors out of the market by pricing below cost. Amazon’s
pricing strategy was threatening American publishing as we know it. 25
According to this perspective, the existential threat posed by e-books is
caused by anticompetitive action and solvable by anticompetitive action. I
disagree.

19

See Ken Auletta, Paper Trail, THE NEW YORKER, Jun. 25, 2012, at 36, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/06/25/120625fa_fact_auletta.
20
Complaint at 31, United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12 CV 2826).
21
Id. at 12.
22
See United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Macmillan was the last to settle, having held out until just four months before trial.
See Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Macmillan in E-Books Case,
Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-at-171.html.
23
Apple, Inc. as a defendant is particularly uninteresting with regard to my project.
Apple has no direct stake in publishing and is motivated by entirely different
considerations. It should be noted, however, that at the time of publication, Apple
had actually lost its case in the Southern District of New York, where Judge Denise
Cote found ample evidence of per se price fixing. Apple is appealing the decision.
United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
24
See, e.g., David Carr, Book Publishing’s Real Nemesis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2012, at B1.
25
See id.
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II. THE LAW AND THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND DIGITAL
GOODS
No doubt, there is an existential threat to the American publishing
industry. But it is caused by competition—and it is much more deeply
rooted than Amazon’s market share. In this Part, I argue more precisely the
nature of the threat, and examine whether collusion can or should be the
remedy.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act very broadly prohibits “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce.”26 While born of a general popular hostility
to the monopolistic giants of the late nineteenth century, the Act also serves
to promote certain economic ideals. Perspectives vary as to whether the
ideal at issue is consumer welfare or economic efficiency more generally,
but either way, the target is the deadweight loss associated with
monopoly—the social loss that occurs when monopolists, and cartels
maximize profits by underproducing and overpricing their goods. How
precisely this deadweight loss is to be eliminated is not completely clear.
The statute’s impossible breadth has left the courts to develop the contours
of the regulation, more or less unimpeded, since the Act’s passage at the
end of the nineteenth century. In that time, the Supreme Court has given us
two primary tests with which to judge anticompetitive collusion: the per se
rule and the rule of reason.
The per se rule usually operates as succinctly as its name implies—
certain highly suspect behaviors are simply illegal per se under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. These are behaviors that “because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry.”27 While
the contours of per se antitrust violations have ebbed and flowed, the
persistent heart of the doctrine is the bar on agreements to fix prices. Under
the per se rule, the plaintiff need only prove the existence of an agreement
to fix prices and that prices were actually fixed.28 As a result, the pricefixing inquiry is often largely a factual one into the behavior of the parties,
eliding the complexities of the rule of reason. Accordingly, these cases
often hinge on evidence of backroom meetings and discussions between
competitors.29

26

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958).
28
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
29
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS ch. x.c. ¶ 27, at 98 (Arthur Hugh Jenkins ed., Kennikat Press, Inc. 1968)
(1776).
27
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Where the court does not see a sole-purpose restraint of trade like
price fixing, it instead considers the case under the rule of reason, pursuant
to which courts weigh anticompetitive effects against procompetitive
benefits.30 The rule of reason presents a much greater obstacle to would-be
antitrust plaintiffs, as the “elaborate inquiry”31 it takes to prove a case can
be quite elaborate indeed. Accordingly, much depends on whether a court
applies the rule of reason or the per se rule.
One particular kind of procompetitive justification for treatment
under the rule of reason has often been repeated and refuted throughout the
history of antitrust: ruinous competition. These are situations where
apparently colluding market participants claim that their restraint is
necessary to prevent an industry from cannibalizing itself in a price war. In
general, the law does not look kindly on ruinous competition arguments. In
the leading antitrust case on the subject, Socony-Vacuum Oil, Justice
Douglas provided U.S. courts’ typical response to such arguments:
But such defense is typical of the protestations usually made in pricefixing cases. Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price
cutting and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible
justifications for price-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were
to be appraised here, the reasonableness of prices would necessarily
become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event the Sherman
Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy would be supplanted
by one which is wholly alien to a system of free competition; it would
not be the charter of freedom which its framers intended.32

But Socony-Vacuum Oil is an old case and, particularly in a postChicago-School world, it is clearly not a completely accurate reflection of
current law.33 There may be enough wiggle room in the law to allow a
properly framed ruinous competition argument to persuade a court that
perhaps the rule of reason is a better fit.

A. Intellectual Property and Ruinous Competition
While they are still disapproved generally, might ruinous
competition arguments carry more weight in intellectual property disputes?
That is, where there exist federally granted intellectual property rights, the
30

N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 5.
32
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 220–21.
33
See In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“The plaintiffs retreat to the general language in the Socony–Vacuum opinion, an
opinion 72 years old and showing its age.”) This opinion—plainly written by Judge
Posner—points to various cases where the Supreme Court has tempered the per se
rule as evidence for its assertion.
31
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government has effectively given its imprimatur to a certain restraint of
trade—the copyright monopoly—in furtherance of the goals of intellectual
property. It seems plausible that the law might tolerate other kinds of
facially anticompetitive behavior that serves to effectuate intellectual
property rights. Below, I flesh out the argument for applying rule of reason
analysis to market arrangements like that between Apple and the publishers.
Among the powers granted to Congress under the Constitution is
the ability “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”34 The Anglo-American
copyright tradition that has evolved pursuant to this constitutional grant is
one that is well recognized as being utilitarian in nature.35 Our law operates
under the belief that the incentives made possible by copyright are useful in
persuading authors to create original works, thus advancing the “Progress of
Science.”
This is to say that intellectual property as such exists in part because
inventions and original works of authorship have the traits of public goods:
They are non-rival and non-excludable and thus unlikely to be produced by
a market economy—supposedly. As such, absent intellectual property
protections, authors and inventors would find it difficult, if not impossible,
to reap the financial and attributional rewards of their labor. In such a
system, rational—that is, wealth-maximizing—creators might therefore
abstain from producing works at all. Intellectual property is thought to
incentivize creation by giving creators the legal hook necessary to cordon
their work off from others.
The Supreme Court precedent on the interaction between
intellectual property and antitrust suggests that Congress’s election to enact
an intellectual property scheme receives some antitrust deference. In BMI v.
CBS, a price-fixing case where the Court eschewed the per se rule in part
because of its own unfamiliarity with applying antitrust law to the music
industry,36 Justice White left the door open to intellectual-property-based
justifications for anticompetitive behavior, though just by a hair. He wrote:
Although the copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to
fix prices among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws,
we would not expect that any market arrangements reasonably
necessary to effectuate the rights that are granted would be deemed a
per se violation of the Sherman Act. Otherwise, the commerce
anticipated by the Copyright Act and protected against restraint by

34

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Lewis Hyde, COMMON AS AIR (2010) 51–54.
36
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979).
35
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the Sherman Act would not exist at all or would exist only as a pale
reminder of what Congress envisioned.37

Digital publishing is at least as unfamiliar to the courts as were the
blanket licenses at issue in BMI,38 and the stakes are arguably at least as
high for copyright holders, who—rightly or wrongly—fear that the
copyright grant is losing its effectiveness. The question, then, is whether the
status quo ante in digital publishing allows for a reasonably effectuated
copyright grant. If it does not, and if the proposed restraint of trade might
tend to effectuate the right, then there is an argument that rule of reason
analysis might be appropriate.
It is easy to see some inherent tension between the Copyright Act
and our antitrust laws, given the colloquialism “copyright monopoly”. The
flip, pedantic rejoinder to the monopoly complaint is that the colloquial and
technical definitions of “monopoly” diverge substantially. It is true that a
copyright holder enjoys the “exclusive right[]” to reproduce and sell their
copyrighted works.39 But a monopoly in a sense that is economically
problematic requires more: Such a monopolist must possess sufficient
market power to control prices.40 In theory, even with a copyright grant,
should suitable substitutes exist, the rights holder would hold little market
power and must price its goods competitively.
Thus, we are told not to be concerned about the antitrust risks posed
by intellectual property for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the
intellectual property right is necessary to create markets in informational
goods, even if it grants a monopoly. The reduction in competition is
necessary for rights holders to recoup the substantial overhead incurred in
creating an original work of authorship.
Second, we ought not be concerned because the rights granted tend
not to be broad enough to give their owners the ability to unilaterally raise
prices.41 The extent to which this is true, however, depends on the scope of
the intellectual property grant—exactly how different must a substitute be in
37

Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
Most likely much more unfamiliar, given the music publishers’ perennial
involvement with antitrust suits and continued operation under a consent decree.
See id. at 10.
39
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
40
See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2013
(2000). It will likely come as no surprise to the reader that I am very sympathetic to
the deconstruction of the use of “monopoly” in intellectual property contexts that
Professor Boyle provides in this particular piece.
41
See id.; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 219 (2004).
38
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order to be allowed?42 The cross-elasticity of demand, however, is itself
restricted by the operation of our copyright laws. That is, with each
protected level of abstraction beyond literal similarity, the copyright
monopoly becomes stronger and stronger. The malleability of copyright
law43 in this regard has come to provide an anticompetitive44 buffer for
firms operating in the content industry that, when combined with an
expanding catalogue of rights and enforcement mechanisms, can make a
copyright look more and more like a restraint of trade.
Nevertheless, even the most maximalist view of copyright leaves
room for imperfect substitutes. Furthermore, copyrighted goods occupy a
number of different markets in which consumers have different tendencies
and habits. Consumers of software, of academic texts, of movies, of novels,
and of television shows might demonstrate varied cross-elasticities of
demand depending on the good being consumed. Copyrights for academic
textbooks, for example, might well provide a much greater monopoly than
do copyrights on paranormal romance novels.45 For the purposes of
keeping this analysis focused on the publishing industry writ large, let us
assume that the average copyrighted book is somewhere between a textbook
and a paranormal romance: Demand is relatively price elastic, but the
imprecise boundaries of the copyright prevent many authors from producing
substitute goods for any given title.

42

The answer is that no one can say for certain, ex ante. Judge Hand explains:
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague. In the case
of verbal “works” it is well settled that although the “proprietor’s”
monopoly extends beyond an exact reproduction of the words, there can
be no copyright in the “ideas” disclosed but only in their “expression.”
Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the “idea,” and has borrowed its “expression.” Decisions
must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
See also DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03
(explaining the substantial-similarity standard) (1963).
43
See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 19–20 (1997).
44
In that the chilling effects that exist in a given copyright’s shadow increase the
monopoly value of the copyright.
45
We can debate this, of course. A textbook, presumably a fact-based work, has
thinner copyright protection than does a novel, enabling the production of very
similar substitutes. However, demand for a given textbook will be much more
inelastic than will demand for most novels: Students must buy the assigned book,
regardless of the absurd price tag or inferior quality. Having compared the price
points of textbooks with those of paranormal romances, I am inclined to think that
inelastic textbook demand, coupled with a paucity of capable authors, creates more
monopoly power than does a broad and fuzzy copyright grant to creative works.
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We are comfortable with this limited monopoly—and frequently
invoke the term monopoly to describe it—in part because we believe it to be
necessary to create a market for creative works. This is plainly and
tautologically true: Rights that do not exist cannot be traded, and the ability
to fence off and trade copyrights seems likely to be a net producer of social
benefit. Furthermore, even where the copyright monopoly produces
supracompetitive benefit to the rights holder, in the manner of a true
monopolist, we ought not be overly concerned, as the possibility of such
rents is a necessary part of the incentive system we believe fuels our
society’s creative engine.46
Whether and to what extent copyright provides a true monopoly is
only half of the picture. That is, the above discussion of the copyright
monopoly adequately describes the pre-digital operation of copyright, the
ideal of how things are meant to function. This theory posits limited rights
that allow for the recoupment of investment in certain creative goods, and it
is not overly controversial. Digital economics, however, are quite different,
and they alter—possibly fatally—the tenuous balance struck by the
traditional copyright grant.

B. Is the Copyright Grant Effectuated in the E-books Market?
For any commodity, increased competition should, in theory, drive
prices down. In perfect competition—admittedly a hypothetical ideal—price
should settle at marginal cost, the cost a firm incurs in producing an
additional unit of a good.47 For most digital goods, however, marginal cost
is so near zero as to effectively be zero.48 From this simplified perspective, a
digital book in a competitive market should be free or near free.49 What is
more, we have readily available empirical evidence of the veracity of this
supposition: Online today, the going price for many public domain works is
$0.00.50

46

Indeed, supracompetitive profits should be necessary for copyright to function.
For non-rivalrous goods, average cost and marginal cost are not expected to
intersect at any quantity of production—average cost will always exceed marginal
cost. If the competitive price is the intersection between marginal cost and demand,
the only profitable configuration is definitionally supracompetitive. See Yoo, supra
note 41, at 228.
47
See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS 258–259 (2d ed. 2011).
48
See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 274 (2002).
49
See id.
50
See, e.g., PROJECT GUTENBERG, (Jun. 3, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://www.gutenberg.
org/.
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This reality is arguably problematic for the traditional functioning
of the copyright grant. As detailed above, the ability of a publisher to
recoup upfront investment in the creation of a creative good is incumbent on
the extraction of supracompetitive profits, even if for only a short time.51
Below, I outline a number of ways in which digital economics exerts
downward pressure on the supracompetitive profits of digital goods
notwithstanding the copyright grant.
1. Retailer Bargaining Power
While the marginal cost of a digital good is theoretically near-zero,
as discussed above, the marginal cost a retailer faces for third-party titles is
somewhat greater because retail buyers pay the publishers for each unit. In
order to act profitably—and in order to avoid charges of predatory
pricing—a retailer of digital goods will have to price at or above its
wholesale cost, just like any other retailer.
However, both the retailer and the wholesaler know the marginal
costs of the goods being traded are essentially zero. A large retailer, holding
out for a better retail price, can expect the publishers to at least be willing to
negotiate: The entire sale price of the good is above cost, so publishers will,
when pressed, be likely to give somewhat.
This process plainly cannot continue forever. Eventually, publishers
will reach the point where their wholesale cost is not enough to cover
average cost—that is, their sunk costs will outweigh possible revenue. Since
publishing practice has long been to take a loss on many titles,52 profits
might dip below average cost across all titles relatively early. Nevertheless,
the normal processes of competition between publishers and between
retailers can be expected to drop the prices of the goods closer to cost,
perhaps to a point where publishing ceases to be profitable.
2. Increased Information and Access to Substitutes
The greater the number of alternative texts that exist for any given
copyrighted work, the more likely it is that one of them will prove to be an
acceptable substitute for the good at issue. While there are less likely to be
available substitutes for goods that are time sensitive,53 books written to be
51

See Yoo, supra note 41, at 228.
See Arianne Cohen, A Publishing Company, NEW YORK MAGAZINE (June 3,
2007), http://nymag.com/news/features/2007/profit/32906/ (“‘Many books are
unprofitable,’ says CEO Peter Olson. Fifteen to twenty best sellers at a time and a
huge volume of steadily selling older titles support Random House . . . . Every
week, the country’s biggest trade publisher releases 67 new books, but it’s the
33,000-book backlist (Ian McEwan’s Atonement, for example) that supplies 80
percent of its profit.”)
53
E.g., Political candidate biographies, current events, etc., etc.
52
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entertainment goods are likely not to share this quality. Accordingly, aside
from path-breakers into new genres,54 few entertainment goods can be
expected to enjoy relief from the heightened competitiveness of the digital
marketplace.
And the digital marketplace is absolutely more competitive because
there are simply more books to choose from. The physical distribution of a
small press’s wares is limited by the firm’s size, while the physical
distribution of a self-published author has traditionally been limited by his
or her vanity.55 Near-zero marginal cost changes this. Anybody who can
write a book can effectively bring it to press for the whole world.
Popular wisdom teaches us, paradoxically, both to disregard and to
fear this development. To disregard it, because publishers are a sine qua non
for quality; anything made without their oversight will necessarily be
plagued by errors, mistakes, and poor writing. To fear, it because selfpublishing increases search costs for readers—the narcissism of web
authors creates an impenetrable morass of junk.56 Part of this cynical
perspective may well have some merit. After all, I do not pretend to be able
to offer any special insight into what distinguishes quality writing or how
important a world-class publisher is to achieving it.
But search costs are most definitely diminishing, no matter the
increase in total volume of available writing. What this means is that the
practical substitutability of books in the digital world should, ceteris
paribus, be greater than what we have seen in earlier markets. A reader with
knowledge of his or her preferences57 can take advantage of publicly
accessible search utilities58 to identify works that best satisfy those
preferences. While works that have the benefit of some marketing might
suggest themselves more readily, the universe of satisfactory titles is greatly
expanded simply by virtue of a greater number of accessible works.
What is more, this process is aided by the sort of algorithmic
preference matching aggressively employed by digital retailers.59 Setting
54

Paranormal romance gets the spotlight again!
However, this has also changed with technology. Print-on-demand books do now
exist.
56
See Steven Rosenbaum, Filter or Be Flooded: Publisher as Curator,
PUBLISHER’S WEEKLY (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/bytopic/columns-and-blogs/soapbox/article/46359-filter-or-be-flooded-publisher-ascurator.html.
57
I recognize this might be a substantial assumption. The argument I find most
compelling for saving local booksellers, record stores, etc. is that sometimes a
consumer needs help identifying the right book.
58
Themselves a product of the low costs of digital information.
59
See, e.g., Improve Your Recommendations, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.
com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?nodeId=13316081 (last visited Mar. 2013);
55
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aside for now the privacy issues inherent in close digital monitoring of
consumer behavior, there is good reason to believe in the efficacy of such
systems. The point is not that these systems make consumers aware of new
goods, it is that they also make consumers aware of competing goods and
their relative prices. Where demand is elastic, it stands to reason that
consumers faced with two very different prices for two very similar goods
would switch to the low-cost version, regardless of its possibly humble
provenance.
3. Vertical Integration
The biggest threat that e-book retailers pose—the biggest threat that
digital goods pose—to traditional publishing is that of a vertically
integrated firm that is not a part of the cartel. Although it was not happy
with the prices Amazon charged for its books, the industry was able to set
some sort of a floor: Amazon was limited by the wholesale price it was
made to pay to the publishers, which, in the absence of other costs, would
act as Amazon’s marginal cost.
A vertically integrated firm would be able to sell closer to the true
marginal cost of digital goods, provided that it has not promised its
competitors to keep prices high. The wholesaler/retailer relationship has
acted as a buffer, however temporary, to the realities of decreasing costs. A
vertically integrated firm dealing in enough volume, committed to
competing on price, would effectively remove that buffer. Theoretically,
competing on price would be business suicide: The new entrant would be
unable to cover its average cost if it maintains the same cost structure
adopted by incumbents. A leaner publisher, however, or a facilitator of selfpublishing, could do a great deal to undermine the competitiveness of
industry incumbents without itself collapsing.
4. Loss of Price Discrimination Methods
The stakes are raised for the publishers because physical books and
e-books are relatively good substitutes60 with drastically different
economics of production. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the alleged
cartel in the Apple case was particularly afraid of low-priced e-books
cannibalizing sales of hardcover editions.61

see also Matt Marshall, Aggregate Knowledge raises $5M from Kleiner, on a roll,
VENTURE BEAT (Dec. 10, 2006), http://venturebeat.com/2006/12/10/aggregateknowledge-raises-5m-from-kleiner-on-a-roll/ (describing new entrant in
recommendation field).
60
Indeed, for some consumers they may be perfect substitutes. For others, the
lower-priced e-book might even be more desirable than a physical book.
61
Complaint at 14, United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 623 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12 CV 2826).
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This fear is not unfounded. The greater the difference between the
price of the e-book and the hardcover, the more theoretically likely it is that
a potential buyer will opt for the electronic version. This matters to
publishers because it partially disables one of the more effective means of
garnering supracompetitive profits: price discrimination.
Price discrimination is the practice of pricing along the demand
curve, charging each customer the maximum that he or she would be
willing to pay. Perfect price discrimination is an efficient economic
situation: There is no deadweight loss because all possible surplus goes to
the producer. Perfect price discrimination is not attainable, but price
discrimination nonetheless tends to be effective in garnering the
supracompetitive profits necessary to stay afloat in intellectual propertybased industries. For books, the traditional mechanism has been windowed
release, where books first come out as hardcovers with large cover prices
meant to target the least price-sensitive buyers and lower-cost paperbacks
follow.62
Digital availability has been merciless to such methods of price
discrimination. While e-book prices still trend somewhat higher for new
releases, the difference is not terribly significant. And, what is more, many
of those consumers who would have paid $30 for a hardcover are now
paying $10 for an e-book. A substantial portion of the lost $20 comes out of
the producer’s surplus—a boon for the readers, but a huge problem for the
bottom line of an industry that depends on supracompetitive profit. Why not
simply delay the release of the digital version? Of course, some publishers
have done exactly that.63 But this solution is at best a stopgap and comes
with a great deal of danger—on the internet, release delays fuel piracy, at
least anecdotally, and piracy is plainly a worse result than taking a cut in
profit margins.64
5. The Public Domain

62

See Cory Doctorow, With a Little Help: The Price is Right, PUBLISHER’S
WEEKLY (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/columnsand-blogs/cory-doctorow/article/42071-with-a-little-help-the-price-is-right.html.
63
See Motoko Rich, Publishers Delay E-Book Releases, N.Y. TIMES ARTS BEAT
(Dec. 9, 2009, 4:12 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/publishersdelay-e-book-releases/.
64
See Ryan Lawler, How Hollywood Drives People to Piracy, GIGAOM (Jan. 19,
2012, 1:27 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/01/19/hollywood-windows-piracy/. There
is a clear trend, at least in the film industry, to reduce windowing delays somewhat
in an effort to stave off such piracy. See Lauren A.E. Schuker & Ethan Smith,
Hollywood Eyes Shortcut to TV, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704167704575258761968531140.
html.
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As demonstrated above, near-zero marginal cost is enough on its
own to undermine the copyright monopoly. But, with the passage of enough
time, the damage is made even worse. As goods age and fall out of
copyright,65 they become zero-cost competition to copyrighted works. This
is as it should be, and it has a nice symmetry as well—the public domain is
the creative wellspring for all creative works, but works within the public
domain are also independent competitors for consumption.
It is hard to gauge how much the wide availability of public domain
works affects prices. Intuitively, it does not seem to have that great of an
effect. That the public domain does not exert more price pressure on
copyrighted works can mean either or both of two things: First, popular
taste does not much demand older works,66 or second, the volume of works
safely67 ensconced in the public domain might be too meager to satisfy
demand. I think the latter more likely—many works that are more than 95
years old still compete admirably. It is the paucity of available works that
restricts their market effects, not the appeal of said works.
The future of the public domain is blindingly bright compared to its
present, assuming, as always, that works will ever again fall into the public
domain.68 Many of the cultural goods we produce today are simply too new
to be found in the public domain. Recorded sound is a nineteenth century
invention, and recording quality pre-microphone is so atrocious—and
degradation of the recordings so bad—that most consumers would not listen
to many public domain recordings for pleasure. Much the same can be said
about early moving pictures.69 Novels are not so technologically limited, but
they are also not so terribly old in their modern form. Besides, in times
before ubiquitous literacy and availability of writing materials, fewer novels
were produced. But our digital goods do not degrade, and we are producing
more creative goods than ever before. Moreover, I am inclined to believe
that the quality—as in, fidelity—of our digital media is high enough to
render them accessible to future generations. All this to say that though the
65

If they ever do. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
And indeed, most works that enter the public domain “naturally” have to be quite
old—only works published before 1923 are sure to qualify. See 17 U.S.C. § 302
(2006); see also Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the
United States, CORNELL UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT INFORMATION CENTER (Jan. 3,
2013), http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm.
67
Or perhaps not so safely. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
68
See generally Jennifer Jenkins, In Ambiguous Battle: The Promise (And Pathos)
of Public Domain Day, 2014, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2013) (lamenting the
impoverishment of the public domain and charting alternative zones of legal
freedom).
69
But see THE CABINET OF DR. CALIGARI (Goldwyn Distrib. Co. 1920) available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrg73BUxJLI.
66

146

THE APPLE E-BOOK AGREEMENT

[Vol. 12

public domain is not necessarily a competitive threat to the content industry
today, it may well be in time.

C. The Amazon Monopsony: Unimportant to Price Trends
As has been shown above, there is no doubt that there is significant
price pressure on the publishing industry. The refrain from the press and
from the publishers has been that this pressure is the result of Amazon’s
monopsony: Amazon has long been the only major player in the American
e-book business, and its status as the largest buyer gives it the bargaining
power to extract deals capable of wringing the publishers dry. It is easy
enough to be sympathetic to this position: For each of the possible threats I
have enumerated above, all except for piracy can be attributed to Amazon.
Amazon prices aggressively, helps consumers identify substitute goods, is
vertically integrating as a publisher, and is facilitating self-publishing.
Amazon also distributes many public domain works free of charge. But
these are all qualities of a highly competitive business, not an
anticompetitive one.
The allegations of anticompetitiveness on Amazon’s part are—at
least as far as the public is in a position to know70—misplaced.
Unfortunately, teasing apart these allegations completely requires dealing
with another section of the Sherman Act and is outside the scope of this
Essay. Suffice to say that § 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits unilaterally
anticompetitive behavior, that is, monopolization.71 A requirement for a
violation of § 2 is market power, the power to increase prices. Market
power correlates poorly with market share when considering digital goods.
Monopolists extract their rents by reducing output and increasing prices.
The producer of a digital good, however, will struggle to reduce output even
with a very dominant position: Relying on the absence of marginal cost,
competing firms can increase production of substitute goods to compensate
for the would-be monopolistic strategy.72 The publishers do have a price
problem, and Amazon is contributing to that problem, but Amazon’s
contributions are not sanctionable. They are merely what digital
competition looks like.

D. Would a Restraint of Trade Countermand the Perceived Failings
in Copyright for E-books?

70

Amazon, like many businesses, keeps many important details out of their
publicly released reports. In order to know with any certainty whether or not
Amazon’s e-books operations have done anything suspect, one would need access
to some of the more closely held records.
71
See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
72
See McKenzie & Lee, supra note 64, at 261.
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In formulating his brief thoughts on the merits of the Justice
Department’s case against Apple,73 Richard Epstein spells out the basic
form of the intellectual property justification for the alleged collusion,
writing:
[I]t is not clear that lower prices are necessarily in the long term
interests of the public at large. As with all complex transactions, lower
prices spell both low costs to consumers and low royalties to authors.
The lower royalties translate into lower level of production of new
books, so that we do not have here the usual cartel situation where
higher prices reduce output. It is plausible that the higher royalties
increase the number of titles available, and by increasing competition
in the new book market, prices are lowered in the long run.74

At its core, this plays to the classic utilitarian argument for
intellectual property, that is, that the creative impulses of authors and
inventors are sensitive to incentives, and maintaining those incentives is a
social good.
The concern can be presented in several different ways. We might
be concerned merely about participation in the market. A priori, we have
economic reason to believe that there will be little to no market for
copyrighted goods without a reasonable possibility of supracompetitive
profit, ergo collusive steps to retain monopoly-like rents are necessary to
effectuate the copyright grant.
It can also be argued that any diminution of publishers’
supracompetitive profits comes with a great social cost that copyright was
meant to foreclose, whether or not wide participation in creative enterprise
is empirically affected. Publishers, in the attempt to compete in the cutthroat
e-book market, will eventually have to cut into their fixed costs (after all,
there are no marginal costs to cut!) And those fixed costs (the argument
goes) are what, historically, have provided quality in publishing and success
for authors: screening, editing, marketing, etc.
I am skeptical of these arguments. Content as a profitable enterprise
served us well—well enough that the concept of the copyright grant seems
sound in principle. But, the publishers seek to ensure that their copyrights
guarantee a commodity market in their wares. I do not mean commodity in
the sense of an undifferentiated good—much of this paper has been
dedicated to how copyrighted works can be differentiated—but rather in the
sense of a good exchanged on the market. Above I demonstrate how falling
prices suggest that commodity distribution might very well cease to be an
73

Hint: Professor Epstein does not think the case has merit.
Richard Epstein, Not Proven: The DOJ Suit against Apple for eBook Pricing,
RICOCHET (Apr. 11, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Not-ProvenThe-DOJ-suit-Against-Apple-for-eBook-Pricing.
74
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effective means of producing and selling copyrighted works. But this does
not meant that the copyright grant is necessarily ineffective—there are other
methods of distribution for which copyright remains an important, if not
necessary, tool.
Furthermore, even accepting the argument that some fix to pricing
is necessary, horizontal agreement as a solution poses its own problems.
First and foremost, price fixing exacerbates the piracy problem, rather than
solving it. By underproducing and overcharging, the cartel only makes
infringing uses more attractive. A broad enough cartel—ASCAP or BMI,
for instance—might have enough market power to survive competition from
close substitutes, but it would do nothing about piracy. In this way, piracy
provides one of the best reasons to distrust justifications of would-be
cartels. In order for the cartel to form and operate effectively, we would
need to strengthen our copyright enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the
monopoly rents are actually achieved. There is already a great deal of
literature on why ever-increasing rights holder control is undesirable,75 so I
do not believe it is necessary to elaborate overmuch on why this is
problematic. Suffice to say that once our collective freedoms become
implicated in the enforcement of a government granted property right, we
ought to think twice about the necessity or scope of the right.

CONCLUSION
Antitrust law and policy can, as I have shown, be critical in the
shaping of the information economy. This should be nothing new—we are
used to the content industry pleading for effective monopolies. James Boyle
has elsewhere shown how the content-industry lobby has, while disclaiming
the “monopoly” characterization of intellectual property, subtly adopted
monopolistic trappings in seeking greater enforcement powers.76 I have

75

See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 82 (2008).
For instance, the refrain among today’s copyright maximalists is that,
substantially for the reasons stated above, “cost-based” pricing is no longer feasible
for digital goods; we should turn to “value-based” pricing instead. See, e.g., Kent
Anderson, Not Free, Not Easy, Not Trivial—The Warehousing and Delivery of
Digital Goods, THE SCHOLARLY KITCHEN (Jun. 13, 2012), http://scholarlykitchen.
sspnet.org/2012/06/13/not-free-not-easy-not-trivial-the-warehousing-and-deliveryof-digital-goods/ (“[T]he information economy works more rationally if it’s valuebased.”).
Value-based pricing refers to the value to the consumer—that is, pricing
pegged as closely to possible to a good’s demand curve. In other words, price
discrimination. In Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?, James Boyle laid bare this particular
duplicative use of “monopoly” by the content industry lobby. First, intellectual
property apologists would disavow the existence of the kind of monopoly that is
meant to invite antitrust scrutiny. Then they would adopt the language of
76
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shown here another, more brazen iteration of a similar sleight of hand: one
in which copyright holders, disavowing as ever any monopoly, seek to price
like monopolists by way of antitrust’s cardinal sin, a horizontal agreement
to fix prices.
In a world where economic efficiency is paramount,77 we might be
tempted by these rationales even if their result is behavior we are normally
inclined to disdain. In response, I would point to the dissent in Leegin,
which cautions against over-reliance on economics scholarship in the
production of antitrust law, pointing out that per se rules have
administrative certainty and clarity.78 We do know that prices for books are
under pressure and are falling. We can reasonably suspect that the future
will hold more of the same, and this might persuade us to abandon our hard
and fast rules. But it is what we do not know—how other means of
monetization might successfully flourish in the absence of commodity
pricing—that should give us pause.
None of this means that copyright as it has existed—without
brazenly anticompetitive assistance—has no value in the digital age.
Intellectual property can still be a valuable incentive for creation even if it
does not precisely guarantee the ability to commodify one’s work. No doubt
there will be some people so distressed by the idea that they might choose
not to publish at all, but we must assume that these will be a minority,
driven as much by a generational fissure in social practice as by the intrinsic
morality of copyright.
A decommodified cultural economy should be as exciting as it is,
rightly, terrifying. But we are testing the waters now through offerings like
Netflix, the Kindle owner’s lending library, and Spotify. These are all forprofit, service-based providers of content, increasingly central to cultural
consumption and yet it does not appear that the sky is falling.
Anticompetitive collusion, which basic antitrust principles teach us as being
monopolistic price discrimination in seeking greater enforcement powers. Boyle,
supra note 40, at 2028.
77
For example, James Boyle’s “Econo-World.” See Boyle, surpa note 40, at 2011.
78
“Economic discussion, such as the studies the Court relies upon, can help provide
answers to these questions, and in doing so, economics can, and should, inform
antitrust law. But antitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate
economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views. That is because law, unlike economics,
is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon the content of rules
and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by
lawyers advising their clients. And that fact means that courts will often bring their
own administrative judgment to bear, sometimes applying rules of per se
unlawfulness to business practices even when those practices sometimes produce
benefits.” Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 914 (2007)
(Breyer, J. dissenting).
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harmful to insofar as it seeks to preserve a business model that we are not
certain we need to effectuate copyright, is not merited.

